By João Ruy Faustino
Before you read this piece: This week I moved to Coventry to study at the University of Warwick, and it was also my birthday—so, I’ve been busy. In the past two weeks I started writing a whopping amount of three articles and wasn’t able to finish even one. So this what I have for you: a text I wrote for a school assignment a year ago. It has little literary or cultural interest—if I had written this from scratch for At Midnight, All The Agents… I would’ve added some things, and removed others. One thing I would add somewhere in the text is that my grandfather almost died the day of the suicide of Getúlio Vargas. His father was an avid reader of Carlos Lacerda’s columns, and he celebrated Vargas’s death with a group of friends. While they were drinking outside, someone threw a big, heavy typewriter from a building—which landed a mere three meters away from my grandfather, a child at the time. I have briefly mentioned Lacerda in an early piece for At Midnight, All The Agents… If you want to know the more overarching meaning of Lacerda and this event, read this piece.
Anyways, hope you’re having a less eventful week than me. Wish everybody a good end to this Summer, and a nice beginning of the Fall season. Hope this article is still palatable to you—our very dear readers!
João
Identification and Evaluation of Sources
This investigation will explore the question “to what extent was the assassination attempt on Carlos Lacerda a significant factor upon the suicide of Getúlio Vargas?” The two main sources used in this work are the academic papers “A Revolution of Agreement Among Friends: The End of the Vargas Era” written by J.V.D. Saunders in 1964, and “Carlos Lacerda: The Rise and Fall of a Middle-Class Populist in 1950s Brazil” by Bryan McCann in 2003. The former is relevant because it delineates the events that unfolded between the murder attempt on Lacerda and Vargas’s suicide. The latter is an analysis of Lacerda’s impact on Brazilian society during the decade.
J.V.D. Saunders’s work is a detailed study into the causes of the suicide of Vargas, beginning from the assassination attempt on Lacerda—known as the Tonelero Case. The professor at Louisiana State University offers an exceptionally detailed timeline of what led to Vargas’s suicide. The source is rich in criminal analysis of the Tonelero Case, containing many dates, historical figures, and actual exchanges between them. The author attains that property by using secondary sources, mainly newspaper and magazine articles from the time period. The fact that Saunders isn’t native to Brazil can simultaneously be understood as a limitation and a value. The possible lack of insight may be a constraint, however, coming from an outsider may provide the work with evident objectivity. This is due to the reality that the suicide of Getúlio Vargas was, and still is a highly contentious topic in Brazil. Saunders is right in pointing out that there is a major concern regarding one of the two suicide notes that the President left—something that is oftimes ignored by Brazilian historian’s accounts of the event. The letters detail the motives of Vargas’ suicide, meaning that this piece of information was crucial when doing my research on the tangible reasons for the suicide.
The second article, written by Bryan McCann, a Professor at Georgetown University specialised in Latin American history, is a portrait of 1950s Brazil’s socio-political tensions—with journalist Carlos Lacerda as the central character. McCann’s essay focuses primarily on how populism spread through the emerging Brazilian middle class. ‘Populist grammar’ was widely used by both Vargas and Lacerda, but the latter innovated via his use of mass media. Another aspect that reinforces the value of this source is its very complete account of the Última Hora scandal—the prequel to the Tonelero Case, and the crisis that led to the cataclysmic event of the 24th of August. Nevertheless, the fact that Bryan McCann is a native English speaker is a limitation, made even more apparent by the paper’s overwhelming use of secondary sources written in English. Also, the historian’s bias against the journalist is left clear by the many remarks criticising Lacerda throughout the text. McCann goes to the point of writing on a footnote that he has “a sceptical assessment of Lacerda’s motives and tactics.”
Investigation
What made Getúlio Vargas - the ruthless Brazilian revolutionary and dictator of the 1930s, then populist president in the 1950s - shoot a bullet into his heart? The circumstances were dramatic at the time of his death, the morning of the 24th of August 1954. Facing an ultimatum from the army, he was left utterly isolated. Conclusively, he chose to “leave life to enter History” (Vargas), as he himself wrote in his testamentary letter.
The Catete Palace, at the time the headquarters of the presidency, was effectively under ‘siege’ since the night of August 5th of the same year. On that date there had been an assassination attempt on Carlos Lacerda. The hit-man wasn’t able to murder the famed journalist - only hitting him in the foot -, but indeed murdered Lacerda’s bodyguard, Air Force Major Rúben Vaz. That opened a Police Military Inquiry conducted “with considerable alacrity and efficiency” (Saunders) that gave way to possibly “the greatest man-hunt in Brazilian annals” (Saunders).
Eventually it would be found that the gunman was hired by Gregório Fortunato, Vargas’s longtime “faithful bodyguard” (McCann) and Chief of the Presidential Guard. An intricate conspiracy was uncovered piece-by-piece, as Fortunato testified that he was suggested by several of Vargas’s allies to ‘fix-up’ Lacerda. “The president claimed ignorance of the plot” (McCann), a claim that to this day has yet to be disproven. According to all the sources analysed, the investigation was never able to incriminate Vargas (although it was cut short by his death). Nevertheless, pressure for his removal came in waves from the Brazilian people, Prof. Saunders mentions “mass demonstrations [following] the funeral of Major Vaz” (Saunders). This was surprising considering his heroic status among the masses—especially the Brazilian working class.
However, the real threat to Vargas was one of a military coup driven by the ‘Brigadier’s Manifesto’—a group of officers led by Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, Vargas’s main adversary in the 1950 election. “[O]n August 10 a meeting was held during which it was decided that Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, (...) would request an audience (...) to suggest that he ask Vargas to resign” (Saunders). This seemed to open the possibility of Vargas resigning, as he wished above everything else to avoid any kind of bloodshed. In his testamentary letter, Vargas reveals the centrality of this intention: “If the birds of prey want someone's blood, (...), I offer my life as the holocaust” (Vargas).
Such impetus was the reason why Vargas refused the offers of resistance made by his allies in case of a coup, or even a declaration of ‘martial law’ that would grant him dictatorial powers to squish the opposition. Orthodox Brazilian historians, who generally have a sympathetic view of Vargas in this period, say that this non-confrontational behaviour arose from Vargas’s desire to protect Brazil’s blossoming democracy. Saunders definitely doesn’t share this view, even as he doesn’t formulate anything openly adverse to Vargas. All the exchanges mentioned by J.V.D. Saunders are consistent: Vargas thought that any resistance against the investigation, or even against the popular upheaval that was brewing, “would cause more damage than good” (Saunders). Indeed, Prof. Saunders’s account evokes a sombre, melancholic tone regarding all of the president’s altercations with his ministers and close friends—with Vargas occasionally contradicting himself. Despite the focus on Lacerda, McCann’s essay still mentions how Vargas was left essentially powerless during the entire crisis. “The president, (...), told the press he felt as though he were governing on a sea of mud flowing directly under the Catete presidential palace” (McCann)
In fact, Brazil had been in turmoil since 1951. Vargas’s government “was beset on all sides by inflation, financial crisis, military unrest, and social agitation” (McCann) as stated by Prof. McCann. This is supported by J.V.D. Saunders', who states “popular dissatisfaction (...) had for some time been at a high peak” (Saunders). The crucial support from the working class was slowly dissipating. Nepotism and accusations of corruption also put the presidency under constant attack from the growing opposition field, of which Lacerda was an emerging figure. Both in his newspaper ‘A Tribuna de Imprensa’ and in his radio show hosted on Rádio Globo, he aggressively attacked Vargas since the end of the authoritarian ‘Estado Novo’ regime in 1945 and the creation of the ‘Populist Republic’. It was no surprise when Lacerda declared “‘I accuse one man… Getúlio Vargas’” (McCann) despite the investigation being still ongoing.
It had been the journalist’s objective for a long time to bring Vargas down, as he believed that Getúlio shouldn’t even be sitting on the President’s chair. As Lacerda stated in his memoir “Vargas was incompatible with democracy” (Lacerda). During the 1950 election campaign, Lacerda wrote in his column: “‘Vargas should not be a candidate for presidency. As a candidate, he should not be elected. If elected, he should not be sworn in. If he’s sworn in, we should resort immediately to revolution to prevent him from governing’” (McCann). McCann reveals how he doesn’t believe in Lacerda’s democratic spirit mainly due to the role of distance; the historian knows that Lacerda in part caused the 1964 coup that killed Brazilian democracy for 25 years. Throughout Vargas’s presidency Lacerda had called for his overthrow, especially in the midst of the ‘Última Hora’ scandal, the case that marked the beginning of the end of Vargas’s presidency.
Vargas’s image had been the most tainted by this scandal prior to May 1954. The incident involved the pro-government newspaper ‘Última Hora’ newly founded by Samuel Weiner—Lacerda’s professional nemesis. Lacerda broke the story in his newspaper and then amplified it through the radio waves. He accused the Bank of Brazil - a public bank - of having funded Weiner’s ‘Última Hora’ “through illegal channels” under Vargas’s orders, as Weiner was “becoming the ex-dictator’s favourite journalist” (McCann). “Vargas cronies” were also involved in the scandal due to the purchase of “lavish advertisements in the paper” (McCann). The gravity of the affair justified a Commission of Parliamentary Inquiry. Even though its fairness is disputed by Prof. McCann, the inquiry “terminated with formal accusations against Wainer and several of his backers, including Vargas’s son Lutero” (McCann). The scandal left Vargas unprecedentedly vulnerable as Lacerda increasingly pointed his guns at the president (McCann). Feeling cornered, a handful of the president’s closest “allies plotted revenge” (McCann) against the newspaperman, asking Gregório Fortunato “to give him a bullet” and bomb him (Saunders), according to the bodyguard himself.
Prof. McCann’s thesis is that the direct ‘clash’ between Carlos Lacerda and Getúlio Vargas was perpetually on the verge of erupting. The assassination attempt on Lacerda was the culmination of the shock between figures that were gladiating for power in Brazil’s recent and fragile democracy. They were leaders of two different social classes with two antagonistic visions for the nation. Vargas had returned as a populist figure, with a discourse that appealed to Brazil’s “growing working class” (McCann). He was ‘the father of the country’, ‘the father of the poor’, who vowed to implement workers rights and land reform. The conservative and fiercely anti-communist Lacerda was utterly averse to this rhetoric. And because Lacerda was able to captivate the rising Brazilian middle-class, with his fiery columns and impassioned radio speeches, he began to represent those who “feared the erosion of their social status” (McCann).
Although the assassination attempt on Carlos Lacerda kicked off the chain of events that led to the President’s suicide, the threat of a military coup and its consequences were a much more significant factor over Vargas’s fateful decision. J.V.D. Saunders' essay effectively asserts that the looming threat of a ‘coup d’état’ by the ferociously anti-Vargas and conservative faction of the army was what haunted the president all through the Tonelero Case. Lacerda had his role in inflaming the atmosphere, both to his main middle-class audience but also to the army. “At the same time, direct calls for Vargas’s overthrow served a double purpose: they stoked middle-class resentment against Vargas’s immoral rule and directly prodded the officers who might undertake a coup” (McCann). Nonetheless his role was ‘drowned’ by the other opposition newspapers, who likewise had a role in inflaming public opinion. Lacerda’s actual relevance is effectively shown in McCann’s work, he and his newspaper was only one out of an otherwise robust media environment. The urban middle class was influential, yet it was only a relatively small sector of the overall population (McCann): the role of Lacerda should not be inflated.
Works cited
Brewer, Sam Pope. “Brazilian Editor Shot, Friend Slain.” The New York Times, August 6 1954, p.4 https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1954/08/06/84129155.html?pageNumber=4
Lacerda, Carlos, and Paiva Cláudio Lacerda. “Getúlio Era Incompatível com a Democracia.” Depoimento, Editora Nova Fronteira, Rio De Janeiro, RJ, 1987, pp. 109–119.
McCann, Bryan. “Carlos Lacerda: The Rise and Fall of a Middle-Class Populist in 1950s Brazil.” Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 83, no. 4, 2003. Duke University Press, http://read.dukeupress.edu/hahr/article-pdf/83/4/661/707532/hahr83_4-02mccann.pdf. Accessed 12 Jan. 2023.
Saunders, J. V. D. “A Revolution of Agreement among Friends: The End of the Vargas Era.” The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 44, no. 2, 1964, pp. 197–213. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2511597. Accessed 6 May 2023.
Vargas, Getúlio Dornelles. “Testamentary Letter of President Getulio Vargas Left on the Bedside Table Next to His Body.” Palácio Do Catete, 24 Aug. 1954, Rio De Janeiro, Rio De Janeiro. https://college.cengage.com/history/world/keen/latin_america/8e/assets/students/sources/pdfs/68_vargas_testamentary_letter.pdf